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I. Introduction
The determinants of migration have received a lot of attention in the economics literature, as
evidenced in the review by Borjas (1994), among others. A consensus view is that both
economic and cultural forces play an important role. Increased standard of living and the
employment  rate  in  the  destination  country  tend  to  stimulate  migration,  while  a  higher
standard of living and growth in the source country reduce push factors for emigration.
Migration is easier between more similar countries, and especially a shared language plays an
important role. There is also extensive evidence on the importance of existing networks of
previous migrants (see Hatton 2003, Mitchell and Pain 2003, Clark et al. 2004 and Pedersen
et al. 2004). On the positive side, the presence of compatriots eases the arrival of newcomers:
the expatriate community helps finding jobs and apartments, and provides an existing social
network. Here, there are decreasing returns to scale: once a critical mass of expatriate
community is reached, further increases in its size no longer similarly ease further migration.
On the negative side, large-scale immigration may generate a backlash, thus making
integration of new migrants more difficult. Due to these counteracting effects, it is usually
posited that the effects of existing immigrants stocks on the flow of new immigrants are
initially positive, but that the effects tend to reduce in the size of the immigrant community,
and may finally turn negative.
Migration studies have tended to focus on permanent migration, but a lot of migration
flows are temporary – for example, a large number of students do part of their studies abroad.
According to Tremblay (2002), the world’s increasing integration leads to rising
internationalization of educational courses. As a consequence, countries encourage their
students to study abroad – benefiting from their cost-free education on their return. On the
other hand, host countries are interested in educating foreign students, partly to attract human
capital, benefiting the domestic economy.
In 2002, the number of foreign students in the OECD countries was 1.9 million, being
on average 5.3 percent of all students in the OECD countries (OECD 2003).1 These migration
flows are highly concentrated: 71 percent of foreign students go to the United States, The
United Kingdom, Germany, France or Australia (Tremblay 2002). The share of foreign
students in total student population is highest in Switzerland (17 percent), Australia (14
percent), Austria (12 percent) and the United Kingdom (11 percent). In the United States, the
1 Different countries use different definitions as to who are foreign students. Most European countries use as
criterion foreign nationality or citizenship, thus including permanent residents and their children. The United
Kingdom excludes permanent residents. The United States excludes permanent residents and refugees (Tremblay
2002). For the purpose of our study, the U.S. definition is most relevant.
2share of foreign students is 3.5 percent. However, 16.6 percent of foreign students in the
United States are at the advanced research level, making an important contribution to
American Ph.D. programs (Tremblay 2002). In the OECD countries, the proportion of foreign
students rose by 30.4 percent between 1995 and 2001.
An important question is who – in addition, of course, to the student – gains from
students being educated abroad. Do foreign students significantly increase the amount of
permanent human capital in the host countries, resulting in brain drain from the countries of
origin or does the majority of those students return home? The question has important policy
implications both for the host country and the country of origin. That some of the foreign
students stay in their country of study is, in fact, well known (Tremblay 2002). According to
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (2000), out of a sample of 4200 migrants
holding temporary permission to work in the United States (H1B visa) 23 percent previously
held a student visa. Clearly, there are good reasons to expect that the experience of having
studied in a country considerably eases subsequent migration. In 2000, several OECD
countries  changed  their  legislation  allowing  a  larger  number  of  foreign  students  to  stay,  in
order to alleviate shortages of skilled labor. In addition to their direct economic contributions,
the presence of foreign students may also significantly invigorate the academic life of the
destination country. The destination country might even benefit from economies of scale in
the education system (Tremblay 2002).
Although there are some attempts to evaluate how many foreign students stay in the
country they study in, we are not aware of any empirical research incorporating student flows
into a more general model explaining permanent migration. As Tremblay (2002: 5) puts it,
“the scale of this phenomenon is extremely difficult to ascertain” – but this is what our paper
aims to do. Specifically, we try to fill the gap in the empirical literature on the effects of
foreign student flows on subsequent migration flows. We take as our starting point previous
studies estimating migration, most notably, Hatton (2003), Mitchell and Pain (2003), Clark et
al. (2004) and Pedersen et al. (2004). These studies do not take into account the role of
student flows. As in these studies, we account for push and pull factors of migration, adding
the effects of studying in the destination country into the list of pull factors. Our hypothesis is
that having studied previously in the prospective destination country significantly eases
migration.
Due to restrictions concerning data availability, we can only estimate cross-section
regressions when analyzing worldwide migration. However, there are time series data on
migration to the United States. Thus, our main focus is on understanding the role of student
3flows when explaining migration to the United States. In addition to being of great interest in
its own right, the United States is the largest recipient of international students. This also
renders the results with the U.S. data more interesting to a wider audience. Understanding the
reasons behind the success of the United States in attracting skilled migrants is valuable for
European  countries  aiming  to  do  the  same.  To  enable  comparison,  we  also  present  a  cross-
section of migration to OECD countries in addition to our panel data analysis on migration to
the United States.
Our paper is organized as follows. The next section presents our model. We then
introduce the data and estimate the relationship between migration and student flows
empirically. The final section concludes and draws policy implications.
II. The Model
When choosing where to live and work potential migrants compare both material
consumption and other aspects of well-being, like social networks. Following Zavodny (1997)
and Pedersen et al. (2004), we write individual k’s expected utility in country j in year t as
),,,( jktiktijkijktijkt XXDSUU = (1)
where Sijkt is a vector of characteristics that affect individual k’s utility of living in country j in
year t, given that the individual lived in country i in year t-1. This vector includes information
on  individual  k’s  home  country:  it  is  reasonable  to  assume  that  most  people  have  a  home
country preference, for example due to the existence of social networks. This vector also
includes the effects of previous migrants from k’s home country in other countries. In addition
to the stock of previous migrants, taken into account in the bulk of previous literature, we also
include in this vector previous student flows from k’s home country to country j.
Vector D captures migration costs. For example, migration costs tend to be higher if
the source country is land-locked, as such countries are often less well connected, and do not
allow sea route connections elsewhere. In our analysis of migration to the United States, we
also include in D the distance from the source country to the United States, and the percentage
of source country population that speak English. Note that the stock of previous migrants
could enter also into migration cost, especially considering psychological costs. We have
chosen to include it  into S as Pedersen et  al.  (2004),  but the results would be the same if  it
were included, instead, in D as we later adopt a linear specification of individual utility.
The economic push and pull  factors,  most notably the GDP per capita ratio between
the source and the destination country and the ratio of the average schooling between the two,
are included in the X vectors. In some specifications, we also include here a variable
4measuring democracy in the source country, as well as GDP growth and unemployment in the
destination country.
We assume individual utility to be linear in the relevant characteristics. Including an
idiosyncratic error ?, the utility function reads as:
,4321 ijktjktiktijkijktijkt XXDSU eaaaa ++++= (2)
where  ?1,  ?2,  ?3,  and  ?4 are vectors of the parameters of interest that we estimate. When
choosing where to migrate, an individual picks country j which results in the highest expected
utility.
We estimate below migration in two different frameworks. We first study migration
flows to nine OECD countries, and then migration flows to the United States. In the first
specification, the probability of choosing country j among the OECD countries is
[ ]),...,,max(Pr)/Pr( 211 ktnttkttkiijktktkt UUUUij ==- , (3)
where n is the total number of countries. Due to data constraints, we do not have observations
for all countries, limiting us to a subset of the nine OECD destination countries below.
When studying migration flows to the United States, we only compare utility available
in the United States to that available in the home country. An interpretation here, as well as in
the analysis of migration to the nine OECD countries, would be that we exclude from the
analysis those who have decided to migrate elsewhere, and focus only on those choosing
whether to stay in the home country or migrate to the destination country. For them, migration
to the United States takes place if
kiitkiUSAt UU > .
In the empirical specification, we normalize migration flows by dividing gross flows
by the population of the source country. This gives us a model to evaluate migration to the
nine OECD countries, parallel to Pedersen et al. (2004),
,4321 ijktjktiktijkijktijkt XXDSm mbbbb ++++= (4)
where m is the log of immigrants admitted, relative to source country population, and
coefficients ? are related to but not identical with coefficients ?, the same holding for the error
term m . The empirical specification for migration to the United States is
,4321 iUSAktUSAktiktiUSAkiUSAktiUSAkt XXDSm ugggg ++++=
with corresponding relationship between the parameters of interest ? and underlying
parameters in the utility function ?. We also estimate the equation
,14321 iUSAktiUSAktUSAktiktiUSAkiUSAktiUSAkt mXXDSm mgggg +++++= - (5)
5with the lagged endogenous variable included – thus taking into account that migration
follows a rather stable pattern over time.
III. Data
The migration data for our cross-section analysis is taken from the OECD’s (2001)
International Migration Statistics. Data are provided for 94 origin countries. The destination
countries covered are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Japan,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the
United States. The number of foreign students enrolled by country of citizenship is from the
OECD’s (2003) Education Database. In most cases foreign students are identified on the basis
of citizenship, in some, however, other criteria – like place of birth or former domicile –
apply.2
The data for the number of foreign students in the United States is taken from the
Institute of International Education Network. As a nonimmigrant class of admission, the data
refer to foreigners coming temporarily to the United States to pursue studies in an institution
of higher education. Graph 1 shows the regional distribution of where the foreign students in
the United States came from over the period 1970-2001. As can be seen, there is some
variation in the composition of source countries over time. Overall, the share of students
coming from the Middle East decreased from 12 to 7 percent over the last 30 years, with the
hike during the seventies mainly being due to a surge in the number of Iranian and Saudi
Arabian students. The share of students coming from Central America and the Caribbean fell
by almost half from its 13 percent at the beginning of the seventies. The same is true for the
share of Canadian students, falling from 9 to 5 percent.
The data for the number of immigrants admitted to the United States is provided by
the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) Statistical Yearbooks.3 The data refers
to all legal immigration, including refugees but does not include foreign students. The data
employed here classify immigrants according to their birth country and not the country of last
residence. They refer to both those who applied from abroad and those who changed to
permanent status while already being in the United States.4
Graph 2 shows the regional composition of immigrants to the United States over the
period 2000-03. As can be seen, the United States has experienced rising immigration since
the 1970s. The graph shows that the composition of immigrants changed to some extent over
2 See Tremblay (2002) for an in-depth discussion and the potential bias arising from this.
3 We thank Timothy J. Hatton for providing these data.
4 For a more detailed description of the immigration data see Clark, Hatton and Williamson (2002).
6the last 30 years. Whereas the proportion of immigrants from Europe fell from almost 30
percent to well below 15 percent in 2003, the share of those from Asia rose from 20 percent to
over 30 percent. The share of those from Africa rose from 1 to 7 percent; while the share of
those from the Middle East, South America, Central America and the Caribbean and Canada
remained more or less the same. The large increase in the share of immigrants from Central
America and the Caribbean at the beginning of the nineties is mainly due to a surge in
Mexican immigration.
Most important for our study, of course, is the relationship between the number of
foreign students and immigration. In fact, correlation between those two flows is quite high,
with 0.36 for the OECD sample and 0.67 for the United States (with both variables expressed
as a share of source country population and in logarithms). We elaborate on this relationship
in the next sections.
IV. Empirical Specification and Results for a cross section of OECD countries
Our selection of variables follows the analyses of Fertig (2001), Clark, Hatton and
Williamson (2002) and Hatton (2003). The dependent variable is the log (immigrants
admitted/source country population) ratio.5 The  source  country’s  GDP per  capita  relative  to
per capita GDP in the country of destination is included to capture expected relative
improvements in the income of immigrants. The lower is per capita GDP in the country of
origin relative to the destination country, the more attractive is immigration. We also include
the ratio of average years of schooling in the source country relative to the destination country
as a proxy for relative human capital stocks. By controlling for the stock of human capital, the
income variable reflects the relative return on human capital instead of amount and average
return  (Clark,  Hatton  and  Williamson  2002).  We  expect  relative  schooling  years  to  have  a
positive impact on migration. The costs of migration depend on whether the source country is
landlocked. The costs of migration are also assumed to depend on the stock of migrants
already living in the destination country. The variables ‘stock of migrants’ and ‘stock of
migrants squared’ capture the combined impact of friends and relatives already living in the
country, and possible negative responses by the native population.6 On the positive side,  for
example, a partner having studied abroad might facilitate the other one’s immigration also.
The host country might give them preference for their linguistic mastery, their familiarity with
the host country’s social context and the lifting of entry barriers by possessing a degree
5 Note that population is measured in thousands to obtain smaller coefficients.
6 Ideally, one would like to control for the stock of previous migrants in specific cities rather than countries and
relate them to migrant flows to those cities. We do not have the data for this exercise.
7“known” to employers (Tremblay 2002). The negative reactions might include increased
competition in the labor market, more restrictive immigration policies, and negative sentiment
towards immigrants and foreigners in general. All variables, their precise definitions and data
sources are listed in the appendix.
Table 1 reports the results for a cross section of 36 source countries and 9 host
countries.7 Due to missing data, our analysis, however, has only 93 observations.
Unfortunately, the number of students studying in the OECD countries is only available for
the period 1998-2000;8 migration flows, however, are not available after 1995. With this in
mind, and the number of observations being only 93, the results of the analysis can merely be
suggestive.
As can be seen in column 1, with a coefficient significant at the five percent level,
migration flows are lower with a higher per capita GDP in the source country relative to the
country of immigration. At the ten percent level of significance, migration flows are higher
with a higher ratio of years in school and a higher stock of immigrants already living in the
destination country. The results also show that student flows and migration are significantly
related, with a highly significant coefficient. Squared immigration and the dummy for
landlocked countries do not significantly influence migration. Column 2 thus omits those
insignificant variables. The result for student flows remains. As the corresponding coefficient
shows, a one percent increase in student flows is associated with about half a percent increase
in immigration.
In the next section we further investigate the issue using data for one country of
destination only – the United States – for which more extensive data is available.
V. Empirical Specification and Results for the United States
This section analyzes migration with the United States as the destination country. As
data availability is much better for the United States, we can test our hypotheses more
rigorously using cross-section time-series (panel) data of immigrants from a maximum of 78
source countries.9 The annual data cover the years 1971-2001. Since some of the data are not
available for all countries or years, the panel data are unbalanced and our number of
7 Our selection of countries is driven by data availability. The countries included in our sample are listed in
Appendix C. As we focus on the United States in the next section, we do omit the United States as destination
country here.
8 For a detailed description of these data see Tremblay (2002).
9 Our selection of countries is again driven by data availability. The countries included in our sample are listed in
Appendix C.
8observations depends on the choice of explanatory variables. Since there was significant first-
order autocorrelation in all models, the disturbance term is modeled as an AR(1) process.
Again, the dependent variable is the log (immigrants admitted/source country
population)  ratio.  In  addition  to  the  variables  of  Table  1,  we  include  the  distance  from  the
source country to the United States and the percentage of source country population that
speak  English.  The  costs  of  migration  rise  with  distance  from  the  United  States.  They  are
lower for English speaking people.10
Column 1 of Table 2 shows the results (of our random effects estimator).  As can be
seen, all coefficients are significant at the five percent level at least. In line with our
hypotheses, the number of migrants to the United States rises with lower relative GDP and
relatively longer education. More immigrants come from countries that are geographically
closer to the United States, have a higher share of native English speakers, and have access to
the sea.11 The stock of immigrants already living in the United States initially attracts more
people  from  the  same  country.  However,  as  indicated  by  the  negative  coefficient  of  the
squared stock variable, this impact reverses eventually. The results also show that
immigration from a specific country is more likely, the more students from that country
studied in the United States in the previous year. The coefficient of this variable is significant
at the one percent level and is quantitatively important. According to the estimate of column
1, a ten percent increase in student flows leads to approximately one percent more
immigration. For comparison, an increase in relative income by 10 percent reduces
immigration by slightly more than 5 percent, and an increase in relative years of schooling by
the same percentage increases immigration on average by almost 10 percent. A hundred mile
increase in the distance between the origin country and the United States reduces immigration
by 4 percent.12
In column 2, we add the lagged endogenous variable. As a consequence, the estimated
impact of students on migration becomes quantitatively smaller, with a ten percent increase in
student  flows  leading  to  about  half  a  percent  more  immigration.  The  coefficient  stays,
however, significant at the one percent level. The lagged dependent variable is highly
significant and the share of the dependent variables’ variation explained by the regression
10 We did not include these variables in the cross country regressions of the previous section as we do not have
the data for all countries in the sample.
11 As distance from the United States and the dummy for landlocked countries both measure travel costs, we also
included them in the regression one at a time. The results are unchanged.
12 If we drop the share of English speaking population and distance from the U.S. (and so exactly replicate the
specification of Table 1), the results are unchanged. We also included the squared distance to test for non-
linearities. Indeed, the squared term is significant at the one percent level, with a positive coefficient. The
coefficient of the share of English speaking population is no longer significant, while all other results remain.
9rises substantially. With the inclusion of the lagged endogenous variable, relative schooling
years no longer significantly affect immigration. The dummy for landlocked countries also
loses its significance as does the percent of the population speaking English.
As a hausman test rejects the random effects model in favor of fixed effects and we
found significant period effects in all specifications, columns 3 and 4 replicate the analysis
including those dummies.13 As a consequence, we cannot employ variables that do not vary
over time or across countries. Language, distance, and the share of population speaking
English  have  to  be  omitted.  The  results  show  that  most  coefficients  are  insignificant  when
time and country dummies are included. Most important for our analysis, however, the
coefficient of student flows stays significant at least at the ten percent level when the lagged
endogenous variable is excluded and at the one percent level otherwise.
In order to further investigate the relationship between immigration and foreign
students, Table 3 includes up to three lags of the foreign students variable in the regressions.
Arguably, students are more likely to immigrate permanently to the United States at the end
of  their  studies.  Unfortunately,  we  do  not  have  the  data  to  test  this  hypothesis.  The  results
show that the number of students studying in the United States in the previous year always
increases immigration, while the coefficient of the second lag is only significant with the
lagged dependent variable included. The third lag is insignificant regardless of the inclusion
of the lagged endogenous variable. We also included the lags one at a time instead of in
addition (not reported in the table). When only the third lag is included, its coefficient is
insignificant when the lagged endogenous variable is excluded, and significant at the five
percent level otherwise. The same is true for the second lag. Clearly, we have problems with
collinearity here, so the results have to be interpreted with caution.
In the next section, we further test the robustness of our results.
VI. Further Discussion
This section tests the robustness of our results with respect to inclusion of additional
explanatory variables and in terms of the observations included in the regressions. First,
regarding additional variables, we follow the previous literature to identify candidate
variables. Mitchell and Pain (2003) suggest including the unemployment rate and economic
growth in the United States. Arguably, people are more likely trying to escape countries
where political participation is weak. We therefore also include a variable measuring whether
or not the source country is a democracy.
13 The coefficients of the country and time dummies are not reported in the tables.
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When it comes to how helpful previous immigrants are in finding a job or apartment, it
might be the absolute number of immigrants that matters or migrants relative to the
population in the destination rather than the origin country. The same is true for backlash
against immigrants. We therefore replace the number of immigrants relative to source country
population by their number relative to U.S. population.
Second, and equally important, we focus on the role of outliers. Some authors suggest
using so-called robust estimation techniques to deal with them. Robust estimators can be
thought of as trying to identify that part of the data best approximated by the model being
estimated (see de Haan and Sturm 2003 for an illustrative discussion). We therefore employ
the Least Median of Squares (LMS) estimator introduced by Rousseeuw (1984) to test the
robustness of our results, minimizing the median of the squared residuals. This estimator will
not be influenced by observations lying outside the typical relationship between the dependent
and explanatory variables revealed by the remaining data.
Table 4 contains the results. In column 1, we include the POLITY IV measure of
democracy. Column 2 includes the rate of unemployment in the United States, column 3 GDP
growth. In column 4, the stock of migrants in the United States is divided by U.S. population
instead of origin country population. The same is true for the stock of migrants squared. As
the table shows, only the unemployment rate is significantly associated with immigration to
the United States. As expected, immigration is lower with higher unemployment. Dividing the
stock of migrants by U.S. population rather than origin country population does not change
the results. The inclusion of the additional variables has no impact on the relationship between
foreign student enrollment and immigration. In all four regressions immigration is increasing
in the number of foreign students in the previous year, with a coefficient significant at the one
percent level.
In column 5 we report the results of the Least Median of Squares regression. As can be
seen, the previous results have not been driven by outliers. All coefficients are significant at
the one percent level and have the expected sign. In the robust regression, the magnitude of
foreign  student  enrollment  corresponds  closely  to  the  results  of  the  cross  section  for  the
OECD, indicating that a one percent increase in student flows is associated with about half a
percent increase in immigration. As we cannot control for fixed country effects in both the
cross section and the LMS regressions, these larger effect most likely represents the pure
between-country variation.
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VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we discover a close link between student flows and migration flows. In
our  cross-section  analysis  of  migration  to  nine  OECD countries,  we  found that  the  share  of
foreign students was highly significant. In our panel (OLS) regressions for the United States,
a ten percent increase in student flows leads to an increase in immigration of between 0.3-0.9
percent. Clearly, we cannot be sure whether it is the students actually staying in their host
country or the impact of other student-related factors driving those results. As one example,
students may tell others about their experiences and have networks that other migrants may
use.
Student flows explain migration more consistently in different specifications than
traditionally highlighted economic variables - like the GDP per capita ratio between the
country of origin and the United States and the schooling years ratio between the two. When
country and time dummies are included, the stock of students also generally retains its
significance, and seems to be a more robust predictor than the stock of previous immigrants or
its square. When measures of the percentage of English-speaking population, democracy in
the source country, the unemployment rate, or GDP growth in the United States are included,
both the stock of foreign students and that of previous immigrants and its square are
significant at the one percent level.
One potential problem in explaining migration arises from the omitted variable bias. It
is conceivable that both student flows and migration flows would reflect an underlying
cultural and economic proximity, not captured by distance or sharing the English language
when explaining migration to the United States. To reduce the impact of this possibility, we
also include the lagged endogenous variable - migration in the previous year - to our panel
analysis. Indeed, the lagged endogenous variable turns out to be the most powerful
explanatory variable of current migration. Importantly, the past stock of foreign students still
retains its significance in all cases. Repeating the analysis using the Least Median of Squares
estimator suggests that the results are not driven by outliers.
Our findings have several policy implications for both origin and host countries of
foreign students. In our OLS regressions for the United States, a ten percent increase in
student flows leads to an increase in immigration of between 0.3-0.9 percent. This suggests
that hosting foreign students is an efficient way of attracting future migration, independent of
the previous immigrant stock. Therefore, European countries aiming to attract immigrants
from developing countries might benefit from educating students from these countries.
Governments would then be well advised to take this into account when considering tuition
12
fees for foreign students. The trade-off arising from the fees is the following. On the benefit
side, charging tuition fees gives additional resources to the host country, and such resources
could be used to improve the financing of universities. On the cost side, tuition may
discourage students from entering, either due to liquidity constraints or risk aversion. This
would then also pre-empt potential gains from future immigration.
From the perspective of origin countries, sending students abroad involves both brain
exchange and brain drain. That part of the students remaining abroad, or later emigrating, is a
cost these countries encounter in order to upgrade the human capital of their youth. However,
emigrants may also serve as a source of remittances and investments to their home country,
thanks to significantly higher productivity of labor in destination countries, as well as
establishing academic and business networks. Given this and population aging in destination
countries with labor often being abundant in source countries, international student flows may
well generate mutual gains.
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Graph 1: Foreign Students in the U.S. (1970-2001),
percent
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
0.25
0.30
Europe
Middle East
South America
Africa
Central America and
Caribbean
Canada
1970 2000
16
Graph 2: Migration to the U.S. (1970-2003),
percent
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Table 1: Migration to OECD, (cross section, OLS)
Explanatory Variables (1) (2)
log (foreign students/ 0.44 0.45
    origin population) (4.90***) (5.05***)
GDP per capita ratio -0.85 -0.80
    (origin/destination) (2.14**) (1.70*)
Schooling years ratio 1.11 1.02
    (origin/destination) (1.82*) (1.70*)
Landlocked, 0.18
    dummy (0.24)
Immigrant stock/ 103.11 30.54
    origin population (1.82*) (1.55)
Immigrants/ population 2800.37
   squared (1.38)
Number of host countries 9 9
Number of source countries 36 36
Number of observations 93 93
R² 0.29 0.28
Notes:
dependent variable: log (immigrants admitted/source country population)
‘t’-statistics in parentheses:
***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively
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Table 2: Migration to the United States, (1971-2001, OLS AR1)
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
log (foreign students/ 0.09 0.04 0.03 0.04
    origin population), t-1 (4.79***) (6.47***) (1.87*) (3.46***)
GDP per capita ratio -0.53 -0.07 -0.17 -0.21
    (origin/U.S.) (3.23***) (3.18***) (0.64) (2.07**)
Schooling years ratio 0.92 0.002 -0.67 -0.02
    (origin/U.S.) (2.88***) (0.04) (1.09) (0.12)
Distance from U.S. -0.0004 -9.25e-06
(8.18***) (2.64***)
Landlocked, -1.05 -0.004
    Dummy (3.52***) (0.17)
English speaking 0.01 0.0004
    (percent of population) (2.61***) (1.29)
Immigrant stock (t-1)/ 12.12 1.51 0.30 1.30
    origin population (t-1) (4.82***) (2.67***) (0.09) (1.65*)
Immigrants/ population (t-1) -29.25 -5.20 -3.36 -4.46
   Squared (3.92***) (2.17**) (0.41) (1.79*)
Lagged Endogenous 0.94 0.83
    Variable (140.99***) (64.30***)
Number of countries 78 78 78 78
Number of observations 1903 1881 1825 1803
Country/ Year dummies No No Yes Yes
R² (overall) 0.57 0.98 0.04 0.98
Notes:
dependent variable: log (immigrants admitted/source country population)
‘t’-statistics in parentheses:
***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively
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Table 3: Migration to the United States (1971-2001, OLS AR1)
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
log (foreign students/ 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.06
    origin population), t-1 (2.37**) (3.23***) (2.30**) (3.32***)
log (foreign students/ -0.001 0.05 0.01 0.06
    origin population), t-2 (0.07) (2.55**) (0.31) (3.22***)
log (foreign students/ -0.01 0.02
    origin population), t-3 (0.55) (0.85)
GDP per capita ratio -0.19 -0.14 -0.18 -0.17
    (origin/ U.S.) (1.82*) (0.51) (1.56) (0.59)
Schooling years ratio -0.04 0.75 -0.02 -0.76
    (origin/ U.S.) (0.28) (1.13) (0.09) (1.12)
Immigrant stock (t-1)/ 1.18 -0.07 1.32 0.07
    origin population (t-1) (1.55) (0.02) (1.53) (0.32)
Immigrants/ population (t-1) -4.34 -2.14 -4.67 -2.60
   Squared (1.69*) (0.90) (1.76*) (0.32)
Lagged Endogenous 0.82 0.81
    Variable (60.95***) (56.96***)
Number of countries 78 78 78 78
Number of observations 1753 1754 1682 1683
Country/ Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
R² (overall) 0.98 0.13 0.98 0.18
Notes:
dependent variable: log (immigrants admitted/source country population)
‘t’-statistics in parentheses:
***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively
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Table 4: Migration to the United States (1971-2001)
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
log (foreign students/ 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.49
    origin population), t-1 (3.94***) (4.86***) (4.81***) (4.47***) (23.74***)
GDP per capita ratio -0.52 -0.54 -0.53 -0.55 -1.35
    (origin/ U.S.) (3.07***) (3.28***) (3.22***) (3.15***) (18.26***)
Schooling years ratio 0.62 0.89 0.93 0.94 1.54
    (origin/ U.S.) (1.84*) (2.76***) (2.89***) (2.77***) (10.70***)
Distance from U.S. -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0004 -0.0002
(8.29***) (8.17***) (8.18***) (7.98***) (15.88***)
Landlocked, -0.98 -1.05 -1.05 -1.07 -0.27
    Dummy (3.24***) (3.52***) (3.52***) (3.06***) (3.45***)
English speaking 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.004
    (percent of population) (2.87***) (2.64***) (2.61***) (2.74***) (3.82***)
Immigrant stock (t-1)/ 11.59 12.09 12.03 41.42
    origin population (t-1) (4.05***) (4.80***) (4.77***) (22.15***)
Immigrants/ population (t-1) -24.71 -29.36 -28.99 -175.96
   Squared (2.95***) (3.93***) (3.88***) (20.77***)
Democracy -0.004
(0.59)
U.S. unemployment rate (t-1) -0.02
(2.91***)
U.S. GDP growth (t-1) 0.002
(0.86)
Immigrant stock (t-1)/ 104.04
    U.S. population (t-1) (2.07**)
Immigrants/ U.S. population -2936.71
   (t-1), squared (1.83*)
Number of countries 75 78 78 78 78
Number of observations 1723 1903 1903 1903 1903
Country/ Year dummies No No No No No
Method of Estimation OLS
AR(1)
OLS
AR(1)
OLS
AR(1)
OLS
AR(1)
LMS
R² (overall) 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.49 0.53
Notes:
dependent variable: log (immigrants admitted/source country population)
‘t’-statistics in parentheses:
***, **, * significant at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels respectively
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Appendix A: Variable Definitions and Sources
Cross Section (OECD countries)
Variable Source Definition
Migration to the OECD OECD (2001) All legal immigrants admitted,
including refugees. Data is by
country of origin. Data are for 1995.
Foreign students OECD (2003) All  foreign  students  enrolled  in
tertiary education. Data are for the
year 2000.
GDP per capita ratio World Bank
(2003)
Gross domestic product divided by
midyear population. Data are in
constant U.S. dollars. The value for
the origin country is divided by
those for the U.S.
Schooling years ratio Barro and Lee
(2000)
Average schooling years in the total
population aged 25+. The value for
the origin country is divided by
those for the U.S. Linearly
interpolated when missing.
Landlocked, dummy Easterly and
Sewadeh (2002)
Dummy equals one if country has no
direct access to the sea, zero
otherwise.
Immigrant stock OECD (2001) Number of foreign born immigrants.
Data are for 1995.
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Appendix A (continued)
Panel (United States)
Variable Source Definition
Migration to the U.S. Clark et al. (2002) All legal immigrants admitted,
including refugees. Includes
immigrants who applied from abroad
and those who are already in the
United  States  but  change  to
permanent status. Data is by country
of origin.
Foreign students Institute of International
Education, various years.
A non-immigrant class of admission.
Someone coming temporarily to the
United States to pursue a full course
of study in an approved program in
either an academic (college,
university, seminary, conservatory,
academic high school, elementary
school, other institution, or language
training  program)  or  a  vocational  or
other recognized non-academic
institution.
GDP per capita ratio World Bank (2003) Gross domestic product divided by
midyear population. Data are in
constant U.S. dollars. The value for
the origin country is divided by
those for the United States.
Schooling years ratio Barro and Lee (2000) Average schooling years in the total
population aged 25+. The value for
the origin country is divided by
those for the United States. Linearly
interpolated when missing.
Distance from the U.S. Hufbauer et al. (2003) Distance between capitals in miles.
Updated with data received from
Howard J. Wall.
Landlocked, dummy Easterly and Sewadeh
(2002)
Dummy equals one if country has no
direct access to the sea, zero
otherwise.
English speaking (percent of
population)
Alesina et al. (2003) Percent of population that is English
speaking. Data refers to 2001.
Immigrant stock U.S. Census Bureau,
various years, and Gibson
and Lennon (1999)
Number of foreign born immigrants.
Linearly interpolated when missing.
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Appendix A (continued)
Variable Source Definition
Population World Bank
(2003)
Total number of residents in thousands
regardless of legal status or citizenship
– except for refugees not permanently
settled in the country of asylum.
Democracy Marshal andJaggers (2000)
0-10 (0 = low; 10 = high) democracy
score. Measures the general openness
of political institutions.
U.S. unemployment rate World Bank(2003)
The share of the labor force that is
without work but available for and
seeking employment.
U.S. GDP growth World Bank(2003)
Annual percentage growth rate of GDP
at market prices based on constant local
currency.
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Appendix B:
Descriptive Statistics (Cross Section, Estimation Sample)
Variable Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
(overall)
log (immigrants admitted to
U.S./ origin population)
-20.70 -13.63 -15.99 1.21
log (foreign students/ origin
population)
-18.66 -6.95 -10.84 1.96
GDP per capita ratio
(origin/destination)
0.01 2.01 0.56 0.43
Schooling years ratio
(origin/destination)
0.21 1.40 0.83 0.27
Landlocked, dummy 0 1 0.02 0.16
Immigrant stock/ origin
population
2.61e-06 0.03 0.003 0.01
Descriptive Statistics (Panel, Estimation Sample)
Variable Min Max Mean Std. Dev.
(overall)
log (immigrants admitted to
U.S./ origin population)
-14.34 -4.14 -8.59 1.76
log (foreign students/ origin
population)
-17.48 -5.66 -9.01 1.31
GDP per capita ratio (origin/
U.S.)
0.007 2.27 0.39 0.45
Schooling years ratio (origin/
U.S.)
0.006 1.10 0.49 0.24
Distance from U.S. 988.32 9683.95 4859.76 2245.17
Landlocked, dummy 0 1 0.09 0.29
English speaking (percent of
population)
0 97.29 8.67 25.27
Immigrant stock/ origin
population
0.00008 0.34 0.019 0.03
Immigrant stock/ U.S.
population
1.36e-06 0.028 0.0009 0.002
Democracy 0 10 5.91 4.27
U.S. unemployment rate 4.2 9.7 6.50 1.32
U.S. GDP growth -2.07 7.28 3.20 2.20
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Appendix C: Country List
Cross Section (Immigration to OECD)
Countries of Origin Destination Countries
Algeria Greece Peru Belgium
Australia Hungary Philippines Denmark
Austria Iceland Poland Germany
Bangladesh India Portugal Japan
Belgium Iraq Romania Netherlands
Brazil Italy Somalia Norway
Bulgaria Jamaica Spain Sweden
Canada Japan Sri Lanka Switzerland
Chile Lebanon Sweden United Kingdom
China Malaysia Thailand
Croatia Morocco Tunisia
Denmark Netherlands Turkey
Ethiopia
New
Zealand
United
Kingdom
Finland Norway United States
France Pakistan Vietnam
Germany
Panel (Immigration to the United States)
Algeria El Salvador Japan Sierra Leone
Argentina Fiji Jordan Singapore
Australia Finland Kenya South Africa
Austria France Kuwait Spain
Bangladesh Germany Liberia Sri Lanka
Barbados Ghana Malaysia Sudan
Belgium Greece Malta Sweden
Bolivia Guatemala Mexico Switzerland
Brazil Guyana Nepal Syria
Cameroon Haiti Netherlands Trinidad and Tobago
Canada Honduras New Zealand Tunisia
Chile Hong Kong Nicaragua Turkey
China, People's Rep. Hungary Norway United Arab Emirates
Colombia Iceland Pakistan United Kingdom
Congo, Dem. Rep. India Panama Zambia
Costa Rica Indonesia Paraguay Zimbabwe
Cyprus Iran Peru
Denmark Ireland Philippines
Dominican Republic Israel Poland
Ecuador Italy Portugal
Egypt Jamaica Senegal
